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NOTES
THE LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF TITLE I OF
THE PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY POLICIES
ACT OF 1978:
THE STUDY IN COMPROMISE
We must also reform our utility rate structures. For many
years we have rewarded waste by offering the cheapest rates to
the largest users. It is difficult for individual States to make such
reforms because of the intense competition in one State for new
industry. The only fair way is to adopt a set of principles to be
applied nationwide.
I am therefore proposing legislation which would require the
following steps over the next two years:
First, phasing out promotional rates and other pricing
systems that make natural gas and electricity artificially cheap
for high-volume users and which do not accurately reflect actual
costs;
Next, offering users peak-load pricing techniques which set
higher charges during the day when demand is great and lower
charges during the day [sic] when demand is small.
We also need individual meters for each apartment in new
buildings instead of one master meter.
-Presidential Energy Message to Congress,
April 20, 1977'
President Carter, in declaring the energy situation in America to be
the "moral equivalent of war,"2 aroused discussion bordering on war in the
electric utility industry when he unveiled his National Energy Plan. The
cornerstone of his public utility reforms was the establishment of national
rate design standards for most regulated public utilities in the nation, 3 a
move viewed by utility industry leaders as an unwarranted and preemptive
intrusion of the traditional regulation by the states.4 Utility industry
1.

Reprinted in [Current Binder]

FED. UTIL.

L. REP. (CCH) 11,936, at 12,133 (April 20,

1977).
2. Id. at 12,136.
3. See notes 9-14 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 111-12 infra and accompanying text. Such a transfer of power from state to
federal government also raises constitutional questions. See Report of the Special Committee on
Energy Law, 10 NAT. RES. LAW. 655, 717-19 (1978); Toll, Some Legal and Policy Questions
Presented by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1979, at 51-53.
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representations testified before committees and lobbied heavily in Congress
as the bill moved through the legislative process.' As a result, the enacted
legislation resembles only slightly the proposals of President Carter. The
federal intervention envisioned in the President's proposal was substantially curtailed.
This note will examine the legislative evolution of Title I of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,6 an examination into both the
substantive regulatory issues facing the electric utility industry and the
procedural considerations inherent in shaping the proper federal role in
utility rate regulation. The examination will also look at a legislative process which saw a strong version of the President's bill emerge largely in
tact from the House, only to be scrapped by a Senate committee less receptive to an expansive federal role. The compromise of the conference committee and the legislation finally enacted will be analyzed in the final section of
this article.
A.

THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL PROPOSALS

The President's bill, introduced as H.R. 6831' in the House and S. 14698
in the Senate, essentially embodied the broad outline presented in the
President's Energy Message. It provided for: (1) a prohibition on declining
block rates,9 (2) peak-load pricing on a seasonal and time-of-day basis," (3)
interruptive service for large customers,' 2 and (4) a ban on master metering
in new buildings. 3 These reforms, were to be implemented by almost all
regulated utilities within two years."
1.

Prohibitionon Declining Block Rates

Declining block rates allow lower prices for each additional unit of consumption. 5 Originally, declining block rates were designed to encourage
greater consumption of electricity." Declining block rates were allegedly
justified because fledgling utilities should be allowed to enjoy the benefits
from economies of scale 7 and technological advances which outpaced inflation and allowed new power plants to produce electricity at a lower cost
than existing plants. 8
5. See notes 111-12 infra and accompanying text.
6. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2644).
7. H.R. 6831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
8. S. 1469, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
9. H.R. 6831, supra note 7, § 513(a)(1)(B).
10. Id. § 513(a)(2)(B).
11. Id. § 513(a)(2)(A)(i).
12. Id. § 513(a)(2)(C).
13. Id. § 513(a)(4).
14. Id. § 516(a)(2).
15. Public Utility Rate Proposals of President Carter'sEnergy Program:Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Regulation of the Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 173 (1977) (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy Administrator, Federal Energy Administration (F.E.A.)) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing: pt.

1].
16. Parisi, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1977, at DI, col. 4.
17. Senate Hearings:pt. 1, supra note 15, at 173-74 (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy
Administrator, F.E.A.).
18. Parisi, supra note 15, at D9, col. 2.
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Since 1970, however, construction costs increases and the absence of
improvements in efficiency has meant that the average cost of electricity of9
new plants has exceeded the average cost of electricity of existing plants.'
If incremental costs exceed average costs, rates which promote increased
consumption of electricity will raise the average cost of electricity." The
chief proponent of the President's bill testified before a Senate subcomittee2 ' that declining block rates no longer accurately reflect the costs of
generation and transmission of electricity, and should be prohibited in order
22
to reduce unnecessary consumption of electricity. The President's proposal
3
provided for such a ban.
2.

Peak-Load Pricing

The second major provision of the President's bill related to peak-load
pricing.24 Peak-load pricing is pricing utility services higher during periods
of greatest demand for energy.25 Such pricing encourages the consumer to
purchase more power off-peak at lower rates. The President's bill would
have required electric utilities to offer rates which reflect seasonal" differences and pricing methods which account for costs that differ by time of
use or time-of-day rates, provided that the customer is willing to pay the increased metering costs.'
the load factor of
Peak-load pricing techniques are designed to improve
29
The load factor
utility.
the
of
curve
a utility by flattening the load
19. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 175 (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy
Administrator, F.E.A.).
20. Id.
21. David J. Bardin, Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.
22. Senate Hearings:pt. 1, supra note 15 at 175 (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy
Administrator, F.E.A.).
23. H.R. 6831, supra note 7, § 513(a)(1)(B).
24. The topic of peak-load pricing has attracted a great deal of commentary in the legal
publications. See Bossert, Defining Time-of-Use Periods for Electric Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Mar. 31, 1977, at 19; Cudahy & Malko, Electric Peak-Load Pricing:Madison Gas and Beyond,
1976 Wis. L. REV. 47 (1976); Grainger, A PraticalApproach to Peak-Load Pricing, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Sept. 9, 1976, at 19; Malko & Stipanuk, Electric Peak-Load Pricing: A Wisconsin
Framework, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 15, 1976, at 33; Newburger, Reforming Electric Utility Rate
Regulation Reform: Peak-Load Prices Without Long-Run Incremental Cost Analysis, 28 CASE
WES. RES. L. REV. 556 (1978); Teed, A PractitionerLooks at Peak-Load Pricing,PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Jan. 29, 1976, at 26.
For an analysis of the impact of peak-load pricing on residential use of electricity, see
Everett & Malko, Measuring the Impact of Residential Gas and Electric Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Dec. 12, 1977, at 20; Nordin, Residential Electric Load Control and Time-of-Use Pricing, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., July 20, 1978, at 22; Roth, Micro-DataMeasurement of ResidentialRate Restructuring, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 15, 1976, at 29.
25. ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION. A TIME TO CHOOSE: AMERICA'S
ENERGY FUTURE 259 (1974).
26. National Energy Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, vol. I, 71 (1977) (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings:
pt. 3, vol. I].
27. H.R. 6831, supra note 7, § 513(a)(2)(B).
28. Id. § 513(a)(2)(A)(i). See also Richardson, Aggressive Time-of-Day Electric Rate Making, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 13, 1978 at 19.
29. Public Utility Rate Proposalsof President Carter'sEnergy Program:Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Regulation of the Comm. on Energy and Natural
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measures how well a utility utilizes its capacity."0 The load factor is the
ratio of the average load a utility experiences to the peak load2 By increasing the load factor of a utility, more efficient use of the investment in utility
facilities would be realized and the need for additional electrical generating
capacity would be reduced."
According to administration officials, the peak-load pricing policies advocated in President Carter's plan are necessary to reverse the decline in
utility load factors nationwide. Without remedial measures, officials
estimate the national average load factor will decline from the 1969 figure
of 64.1% to 60% by 1985.11 With the enactment of the Carter proposals, this
figure should rise to 65% by 1985.14 The benefits of the higher load factor
are the capital savings realized through a reduced need for electrical
generating capacity, estimated to be $23 billion by 1985."5
3.

Interruptive Service

An additional provision in the President's bill required electric utilities
to offer large industrial or commercial consumers the option of having their
36
service interrupted during the time the utility reached its peak demand.
This feature, known as interruptible service, allows the utility to reduce its
peak demand and improve its load factor,37 in a manner similar to peak-load
pricing techniques. The customer is given the incentive to agree to such interruptible service through a lower rate, which reflects the savings the
utility realizes from the flatter load curve.3 '
4.

Master Metering

A final provision of the administration's proposals would prohibit
master metering for new buildings. 9 According to the administration,
tenants of master-metered buildings use an average 35% more electricity
than tenants in individually-metered buildings." This measure is designed to
Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, 145 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings:pt. 2]
(statement of Sherwood Smith, President, Carolina Power and Light Co.).
30. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. I, supranote 26, at 78 (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy
Administrator, F.E.A.).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 73.
33. Id. at 78.
34. Id. at 84.
35. Id. at 84. This savings represents an estimated 49,000 megawatts of new generating
capacity that would otherwise be needed by 1985. Senate Hearings:pt. 1, supra note 14, at 162
(statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.). The net capital savings is only
$13 billion, however, since $10 billion in increased capital investment is required for the purchase and installation of more sophisticated meters to implement time-of-day pricing. House
Hearings:pt. 3, vol. I, supra note 24, at 84 (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy Administrator,
F.E.A.).
36. H.R. 6831, supra note 7, § 513(a)(2}(C).
37. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. I., supra note 26, at 88 (statement of David J. Bardin,
Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.).
38. H.R. 6831, supra note 7, § 513(a)(2)(C).
39. Id. § 513(a)(4).
40. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. I, supra note 26, at 89 (statement of David J. Bardin,
Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.).
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"increase conservation incentives by assuring that electricity users in new
buildings pay their own monthly bills, rather than finding their bills 'hidden'
in their rent.""1
The implementation and enforcement provisions of the President's bill
stirred the greatest controversy and caused the most concern in the electric
utility industry."' Essentially, the bill empowered the federal government to
supervise an overhaul of electric rate structures in the nation. While the
bill purportedly left enforcement responsibility to the states willing to assume
it, the bill authorized the Federal Energy Administrator to set utility
rates in those states where the state regulators had not acted within the
two-year period.4 3 The Administrator enforces this right by bringing an action in a U.S. District Court to enjoin any further rate increases until the
national policies are implemented."

B.

THE LEGISLATION AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE

The U.S. House of Representatives registered no perceptible complaint
to either the promulgation of national rate design standards or the federal
intervention required in the implementation method advocated in the President's bill. In fact, pages of testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Energy Conservation and Regulation, as well as a significant portion of the
committee report recommending passage of H.R. 6831, were devoted to the
discussion of the need for nationwide utility rate standards as well as
strong measures to enforce them.
With some modification, the proposals submitted by President Carter
were reported out of committee and passed by the House. The noteworthy
substantive change by the House was the enactment of several new standards in addition to those proposed by the administration.
To analyze the issues raised by the House action on the bill, the discussion is presented in three sections: (1) the justification for national legislation, (2) the modification of the legislation, and (3) the additions to the
legislation.
1.

The Justificationfor National Legislation

A threshold determination necessary in considerating federal legislation so potentially preemptory of state regulation is whether a problem requires federal action. In other words, what compelling circumstances justify
such a radical departure from the traditional balance of utility regulation,
where individual states have shouldered the bulk of the responsibility?
The overriding justification asserted by the House, and mentioned by
41. National Energy Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. an Energy and Power of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, vol. II,892 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. II] (statement of Robert F. Hemphill, Jr.,
Associate Assistant Administrator, F.E.A.).
42. See notes 111-12 infra and accompanying text.
43. H.R. 6831, supra note 7, §§ 516(a)(2)(B), 516(b)(1). The Federal Energy Administrator
was also granted authority under § 516(a)(3) to grant an additional three years if good-faith efforts to comply are being made.
44. Id. § 516(c).
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President Carter in his Energy Message,45 was the prevention of economic
hardship to those states willing to implement the necessary rate reforms
absent uniform activity by other states." According to testimony before the
House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Regulation, individual
states are reluctant to initiate rate reform for fear that a competitive disadvantage to the state will result as preferential rates allowed to industrial
47
and commercial users under the old rates disappear. States cannot be
trusted to reform rates because of the understandable parochial interests in
retaining and attracting industry.4" Thus, the argument concludes, if all
states were required to implement certain minimum and consistent utility
rates pursuant to national legislation, the concern with attracting industry
by utility rates would diminish.49
A second rationale offered for the national standards was the
"regulatory prod" necessary to stimulate a timely evolution of utility
rates. 0 According to testimony by administration officials, the utility industry and state regulatory authorities will move slowly on rate reform
without Congress establishing an appropriate federal climate." This is partly due to natural conservatism and resistance to change. 2 But another cause
is the lack of staff and resources at the state level necessary to draft and
implement rate design proposals. Accordingly, with quick congressional action, reform could be realized over a few years as opposed to the decades
required if public utility regulation evolves gradually. 4
Authoritative federal action was also deemed necessary because rate
design was perceived as a national problem.5 It was arguably quite proper
for Congress to involve itself in rate design since the inefficient utilization
45.
46.

See text accompanying note 1 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 496, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 4, 129, 132 (1977) [hereinafter cited as

HOUSE REPORT].

47. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. I, supra note 26, at 74 (statement of David J. Bardin,
Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.). Representative John Dingell of Michigan, the Congressman who
chaired the hearings on the President's public-utility proposals, concedes the extent to which industry considers utility rates when locating may be overestimated. But that does not weaken
the case for national legislation.
What industry does is not as important as what state regulators and voters
perceive it might do if regulatory policy were to be changed. There is ample
evidence that has been supplied to the subcommittee of examples of major advertising campaigns which have been launched by industrial representatives to defeat
ballot items items dealing with rate questions.... In each and every one of these
instances, they cited the importance of low rates to local industry and the threat of
job loss should the electorate vote for rate reform."
A CongressmanSpeaks Up on Energy and Utility Legislation,PUB.UTIL. FORT., Oct. 13,1977, at 26.
48. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. II, supra note 41, at 828 (statement of Edward Berlin,
Deputy Chairman, New York Public Service Commission).
49. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46, at 129.
50. Id. at 130.
51. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. I,supra note 26, at 75 (statement of David J. Bardin,
Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.; PuB. UTIL. FORT., supra note 47, at 26.
52. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. II, supra note 41, at 75 (statement of David J. Bardin,
Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.).
53. Id HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46, at 130.
54. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. I, supra note 26, at 75 (statement of David J. Bardin,
Deputy Administrator, F.E.A.).
55. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. II, supra note 41, at 827-28 (statement of Edward Berlin,
Deputy Chairman, New York Public Service Commission).
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of capital resources, resulting from inefficiently designed rates, undoubtedly
affected interstate commerce in a significant manner. 6 The legislation was
viewed as essentially "balancing of local conditions
against the national
5' 7
needs to conserve fuel and capital resources.
The House Committee report suggests a consensus that federal legislation imposing minimum rate standards was not only justified, but absolutely
necessary. As a result, the House essentially adopted President Carter's
proposed federal legislation and added several substantive provisions of its
own.
2.

The Modification of the Legislation

The House accepted and further strengthened the procedural portions
of the President's bill dealing with implementation and enforcement of the
national policies. State regulatory agencies were granted two years to implement the proposals, and absent available time extensions, the Federal
Power Commission was empowered to step in and set the rates under the
standards.-" Similarly, the Commission was given the enforcement power of
enjoining rate increases until the standards were implemented, 9 as suggested by the President." But the House went one step further. The Commission was given authority to seek judicial review in U.S. Courts of Appeal
of state regulatory actions on the standards.6' Consumers and other interested parties were also given the power to request federal judicial
review of such determinations in limited situations.
House acceptance of the substantive standards portion of the
President's bill was mixed. The House bill adopted the Carter proposals on
time-of-day63 and seasonal peak-load pricing, 4 but added a wrinkle of its
own. State regulatory agencies were required to consider, in determining
costs of service for utility customers, the incremental costs in providing additional killowatt hours of electricity to each class of customers,65 a practice
known as marginal cost pricing. Another modification provided in the
House bill was the provision allowing a deviation from cost-based rates
where the state legislature or relevant regulatory authority provides for a
subsistence amount of electricity to low-income residential customers, or
"lifeline" rates.
56. Id.
57. PUB. UTIL. FORT., supra note 47, at 26.
58. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 536 (1977).
59. Id. § 537.
60. See text accompanying notes 4344 supra.
61. H.R. 8444, supra note 58, § 538(a).
62. Id, § 538(b). Consumers were granted a right of review in U.S. courts of appeals
only where the determinations was not reviewable in state courts or, if reviewable in state
courts, the commission is not permitted to intervene as a matter of right.
63. Id § 511(a)(2)(A). This section required implementation of time-of-day rates only if
cost-effective, defined in § 511(a)(2)(C) to mean situations where the long-run benefits of rates are
likely to exceed metering costs associated with implementation of such rates.
64. Id § 511(a)(2)(B). Seasonal pricing subject to cost-effective test of § 511(a)(2)(C) defined
in note 61 supra.
65. Id- § 532(a)(2)(B).
66. See notes 174-182 infra and accompanying text.
67. H.R. 8444, supra note 56, § 511(b). See also notes 207-219 infra and accompanying
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The President's bill was weakened, however, when the House refused
to accept the proposed ban on declining block rates. Under the House bill a
utility would be allowed to charge on a declining block basis when it convinced the state regulatory authority in an evidentiary hearing that the
rates were cost-justified.68 The House found an absolute prohibition was unwarranted.6 9 Testimony was presented to the House Subcommittee on
Energy Conservation and Regulation which found that block rates would be
justified for residential customers under some pricing schemes. ° Where only kilowatt hours are metered, capacity or fixed costs are recovered in the
first several hundred kilowatt hours. After that point, the remaining blocks
conceivably could be flat or cheaper, and still be cost-justified."
With these modifications simultaneously strengthening and weakening
the President's plan, the bill was reported out of Committee and passed by
the House. Clearly the most significant addition by the House was the new
standards added in the House Subcommittee.
3.

The Additions to the Legislation

Before the President's legislation left the House Subcommittee on
Energy Conservation and Regulation, several regulations were added.
These standards related to (1) advertising,72 (2) termination of service,73 (3)
automatic adjustment clauses,74 (4) information to consumers,75 and (5) intervention of consumers in rate proceedings. 6
Seasoned observers of federal utilities legislation attribute to two Congressmen, John Dingell of Michigan and Richard Ottinger of New York, the
responsibility for adding these sections to the President's legislation. According to W. Dunham Crawford, then President of the Edison Electric Institute, these proposals were matters Dingell and Ottinger "have been trying to get through Congress for several years without success."" Crawford
contends the legislation was passed this time because "the House has just
gotten on the bandwagon to try to cooperate with the President .... "
These observations appear irrefutable. Reprentative Dingell, as Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power, was in a singularly
good position to seize the opportunity and succeed in getting his favorite
68. Id. § 511(a)(1). Any proposed declining block electric rate, purported to be justified on
the basis of economics of scale, was to be rigorously examined on the basis of the record compiled in the required evidentiary hearing. The burden of proof was placed on the utility seeking to
use such a rate method. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46 at, 137.
69. H.R. 8444, supra note 58, § 511(a)(1). If rates reflect cost, declining blocks were allowed.
70. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. II, supra note 41, at 876 (statement by Robert Uhler, Executive Director, Electric Utility Rate Design Study); Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at
339 (statement by Robert Uhler, Executive Director, Electric Utility Rate Design Study).
71. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 331 (statement by Robert Uhler, Executive
Director, Electric Utility Rate Design Study).
72. H.R. 8444, supra note 58, § 512.
73. Id. § 523.
74. Id. § 514.
75. Id. § 522.
76. Id. § 535.
77. An Interview with EEl President W. Donham Crawford, PUB. UTIL. FORT. Sept. 1,

1977 at 29.
78. Id.

Legislative Evolution

1979]

utility proposals "railroaded" through the House with the rest of the President's energy package. Representative Ottinger, in the less visible yet
powerful position of ranking member on the House Subcommittee on
Energy and Power,79 was a strong proponent of the Dingell revisions. The
President's bill as it left Dingell's subcommittee in fact represented a combination of H.R. 6831, the original Carter proposal, and H.R. 6660,"0 a bill
sponsored by Representative Dingell providing for, among other things, national utility legislation on the five afore-mentioned issues.' These five additional standards will be discussed individually below.
a.

Advertising

The federal standard on advertising provided that utilities were prohibited from charging off to ratepayers expenses from three types of advertising:"2 (1) promotional, defined to include advertising which induces consumers to select additional utility services or applicances;83 (2) institutional
advertising designed to enhance the public image of the utility;84 and (3)
political advertising intended to influence voting or public opinion on
legislation. Expressly exempted by the standard was informational advertising which promotes energy conservation or shifting use from peak demand. 6
The legislation does not prohibit these certain forms of advertising but
provides that the costs will be borne by the shareholders of the utility and
not by the customers." According to Representative Dingel, this is the only
fair way "[s]ince the benefit of that kind of advertising flows not to the
ratepayer but to the stockholder." 8
b.

Termination of Service

The second federal standard introduced in the House Subcommittee
related to termination of service. This section provided that electric utilities
were prohibited from terminating electricity to any consumer except where
procedures prescribed by the state regulatory agency were followed.89 To
adequately protect the consumer, these state procedures had to provide: (1)
79. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol. I, supra note 26, at 1.
80. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 376 (statement of Joseph Swidler, former
chairman, Federal Power Commission).
81. H.R. 6660, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 312 (advertising), § 323 (termination of service), §
314 (automatic adjustment clauses), § 322 (information to consumers), and § 401 (consumer participation) (1977).
82. H.R. 8444, supra note 58, § 512(a).
83. Id. § 512(c)(4).
84. Id. § 512(c)(2).
85. Id. § 512(c)(3).
86. Id. § 512(b)(1).

87.

HOUSE REPORT,

supra note 46, at 140.

88. PUB. UTIL. FORT., supra note 47, at 27. Other authors have more fully examined the
utility advertising issue. See Netschert, Then and Now With Utility Advertising and Marketing,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 9,1978 at 17; Public Utilities: The Allowance of Advertising Expenditures
for Ratemaking Purposes-Is This Trip Really Necessary? 29 OKLA. L. REV. 202 (1976). One
writer has concluded restrictions on utility advertising are unjustified and will be short-lived.
See Ciscel, A Tempest in a Teapot. Utility Advertising, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 12, 1976, at 35.
89. H.R. 8444, supra note 58, § 523.
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for reasonable prior notice and an opportunity to contest, in no event less
than 15 days before termination, and (2) that no termination for nonpayment for electric service would be allowed during a period "especially
dangerous to health."9 ' In other words, according to Representative Dingell,
"the utility shall be rather careful in terminating service in instances where
termination might lead to death or severe health peril."92
c. Automatic Adjustment Clauses
Additional House legislation dealt with automatic adjustment clauses,93
which allow utilities to raise rates at once to reflect certain cost increases.94
The House Subcommittee wanted to insure that such clauses "provide[d] incentives for efficient use of resources" and did not merely pass on costs
without challenge. 5 To meet the objective, all rate increases were prohibited unless (1) there is opportunity to consider the rate increase "in an
evidentiary hearing ... prior to the date such increase takes effect,"96 or (2)
the rate increase is established pursuant to an automatic adjustment clause
which had been reviewed by the state regulatory authority in the last two
years and reviewed in an evidentiary hearing within the last four years."
The clause must be found in these reviews to (1) provide for effective incentive for efficient resource use and (2) allow rate increases only when
necessary to enable to utility to meet its immediate short-term financial
obligations.9"
d.

Information to Consumers

A fourth proposal concerned information to consumers. This provision
required electric utilities to transmit to customers periodically "a clear and
simple statement of the existing and any proposed rate schedule[s]," and,
upon request, a record of the customer's energy consumption.9 9 The House
Subcommittee felt this information would enable the consumer to conserve
electric energy and reduce his bill.09
90. Id. § 523(1).
91. Id. § 523(2).
92. PUB. UTIL. FORT., supra note 43, at 27. Termination of service by utilities has attracted
much commentary in the legal periodicals. See O'Brien, Protecting the Consumer in Utility Service Terminations, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 452 (1977). The Right to a Hearing Prior to Termination
of Utility Services, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1057 (1973); Proceduresfor Termination of Utility Service:
The Requirements of Due Process, 64 KEN. L.J. 180 (1975); Utility Termination Pay Now and
Litigate Later, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 855 (1975); The Right to Light: Due Process and Public Utility Termination,27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 529 (1973).
93. H.R. 8444, supra note 58, § 514.
94. Wall St. J., June 15, 1977, at 20, col. 3.
95. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 46, at 14041.
96. H.R. 8444, supra note 58, § 514(a)(1).
97. Id. § 514(c).
98. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46, at 140.
99. H.R. 8444, supra note 58, § 522.
100. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 143. Other commentators have also concluded
utilities could supply more information to aid the conservation effort by consumers. See
Baldwin, Meters, Bills, and the Bathroom Scale, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 3, 1977, at 11.
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e.

Intervention

The final provision added in the House Subcommittee related to consumer participation in rate proceedings and funding for intervenors.' The
section granted any electric consumer a right of intervention in any state
regulatory proceeding where a determination is made as to the implementation of a national standard." 2 This proposal was designed, Representative
Dingell states, to "substitute for having the federal government appear and
involve itself in every rule-making and rate-making case in the country."'0 3
The provision additionally required the utility to compensate consumer
intervenors for expenses of the proceeding in limited situations where (1)
the proceeding related to the implementation of a national standard, (2) the
consumer has prevailed on the issue of utility compliance with the standard,
and (3) the intervenor's viewpoint might not be heard absent funding.'04
The President's public utility legislation, as modified and amended, was
reported out of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power on June 16, 1977.105
Carter's major provisions emerged largely intact, although somewhat cluttered with the excess baggage tacked on by Representative Dingell.
Carter's imposition of an expansive federal supervisory role was also
preserved, if not strengthened, by the House Subcommittee action.
The legislation was given summary approval by the House Ad Hoc
Committee on Energy, 6 reintroduced with the entire energy package, and
passed by the House as Title I, Part V of H.R. 8444 on August 5, 1977, by a
vote of 244-177.107
A far more critical analysis lay waiting in the Senate.
C.

THE SUBSTITUTED LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE

The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources began consideration of President Carter's public utility proposals in late July 1977,00
and when the legislation was reported out of committee on September 19,
1977,'1 only a trace of the President's plan remained. In what was termed a
"major blow to President Carter's energy program," ' the Senate Committee rejected the sweeping rate reform proposals desired by Carter for a
stripped down version of the legislation to replace the President's bill. As a
substitute for the prevasive federal authority provided in Carter's bill to
implement his proposals, the Senate Committee gave the Secretary of
Energy authority to (1) intervene in state rate cases as an informed ad101. H.R. 8444, supra note 54, § 535.
102. Id. § 535(a).
103. PUB. UTIL. FORT., supra note 47, at 26.
104. H.R. 8444, supra note 54, § 535(b)(1)(A).
105. Wall St. J., June 16, 1977, at 14, col. 3.
106. The measure was approved by a 26-14 vote.
107. 123 CONG. REC. H8826-7 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977).
108. Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Regulation
commenced on July 27, 1977. Senate Hearings:, pt. 1., supra note 15, at 1.
109. S. REP. No. 442, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
The bill was reported out by a 12-3 vote.
110. N.Y Times, Sept. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
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vocate of certain rate reforms,"' and (2) require the collection of cost of service information by utilities and state regulatory agencies."' The power of
the federal government to seek judicial review of state agency actions was
expressly denied."'
The cause of such an upheaval was basically two-fold. The major driving force was a skillful and massive lobbying effort by electric utilities and
state regulatory administrators."' These forces united in opposition to a
transfer of control of public utility regulation from the states to the federal
government. As stated by the Chairman of the Edison Electric Institute, "if
the law were to be passed the way it is in the House bill, it would be the
death knell .. .of state regulation.."". 5 One utility executive envisioned state
regulatory commissions as "virtual branch offices of the U.S. Department of
'6
Energy..
".
Notable resistance to a major federal role was expressed by influential
senators serving on the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. According to reporters observing committee action, there was almost
unanimous opposition to federal leadership proposed by President Carter." 7
The Committee's powerful chairman, Senator Henry Jackson of Washington,
felt it would have been "a terrible mistake" to allow the federal government
to "preempt state regulatory authorities" over utility rates."' As Senator
Floyd Haskell of Colorado put it, "It would be folly . . . for the federal
government to take over ratemaking.""'
The next three sections will analyze the Senate's revision of the President's program by (1) examining the rationale for the reduced federal role in
utility ratemaking, (2) reviewing the provisions of the Senate's substituted
bill, and (3) discussing the "lifeline" amendment which attempted to
reconstruct a major federal role in utility rate regulation.
1.

Rejection of a Major FederalRole

Probably the greatest lesson from the evolution of this legislation
comes from the rationale given by the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources for destroying a federal role so carefully constructed by
President Carter and the House. The report of the Committee listed four
findings, and implied a fifth, which justified the severe curtailment of the
federal supervisory power.
Two of the findings represent direct rejections of the House's rationale
for the expansive Federal role. Specifically, (1) by failing to comment on the
supposed economic hardship suffered by those states implementing the rate
111. S. 2114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977).

112. Id. § 5(b).

113. Id. § 6(c).
114. Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1977, at 5, col. 2. According to some accounts, utilities were
caught napping when the House measure was being discussed. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1977, at 24,
col. 1.
115.

W. Donham Crawford, PUB. UTIL. FORT., supra note 77, at 29.

116. Charles S. McNeer, President of Wisconsin Electric Power Co., as quoted in Clymer,
Anxious Utilities Try Lobbying Indirectly, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1977, at 24, col. 1.
117. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
118. Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1977, at 6, col. 3.
119. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
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design proposals, the Senate in effect discarded the primary rationale offered by the House"' and the President."' Additionally, in contrast to the
House Report, 2 (2) the Senate Committee found states to be making con23
siderable progress on their own in utilizing new rate design techniques.'
Other justifications reported by the Senate Committee included24 (3) the
federal preemption of state regulation would be counterproductive, (4) the
uncertainty and delay necessitated by the federal intervention would harm
the financial health of utilities," and (5) no national consensus supports the
26
implementation of costing methodologies proposed by the administration.'
a.

Rejection of the Driving Away Industry Argument

The major justification for national legislation asserted by the House
was the need to protect states innovative in rate design from economic hard
ship due to loss of industry." The Senate Committee largely discounted this
argument. In fact, one witness before the Committee, the chairman of one of
the most innovative state regulatory commissions in the country, testified
that he felt his state did not need to "be protected for being out front on
these issues because the benefits far exceed the associated costs."'"
Another witness testified that the determinative effect of utility rates
in industrial location was largely overstated since electricity represents
only 2-3% of the cost of manufactured products.'" Additional testimony,
disclosed that utility rates are one of the least important factors in comparing potential plant locations.2 Access to raw materials, availability and efficiency of labor, transportation conditions, and access to markets are all far
more important in determining where new industrial plants and commercial
facilities will be established. 3'
A representative of twelve large industrial consumers stated that
federal legislation to reduce disparities in utility rates from state to state
would be futile."2 As stated in this testimony, the bill does nothing to
120.
121.
122.

See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 1 supra.
See note 50 supra and accompanying text.

123.

SENATE REPORT,

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 9.
Id
Id.

supra note 109, at 9, 13.

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46, at 129, 132. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying

text.
128. Senate Hearings:pt. 1, supra note 15, at 470 (statement of Charles Cicchetti, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Utility Commission). Mr. Cicchetti had testified earlier before the House
Subcommittee on Energy and Power, stating that he felt rate reform was "truly advantageous
for us in acquiring industrial and employment opportunities from states which don't have time of
day discounts." House Hearings:pt. 3, voL II, supra note 41, at 966 (statement of Charles Cicchetti, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Utility Commission).
129. House Hearings:pt. 3, voL II, supra note 41, at 931 (statement of Sherwood Smith,
President, Carolina Power & Light Co.). See also Senate Hearings:pt. 2, supra note 29, at 137
(statement of Sherwood Smith, President, Carolina Power & Light Co.).
130. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 365 (statement of Joseph Swidler, former
Chairman, Federal Power Commission [FPC]).
131. Id.
132. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 487 (statement of Jay B. Kennedy, Exec.
Dir., Electricity Consumers Resource Council).
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change the variation in fuel costs between regions of the United States.
Since fuel costs represent 43% of the cost of electricity, there is little the
federal government can do to reduce the electricity costs differences between the states.'33
b.

Rejection of the Regulatory Prod Argument

The House's second rationale for national ratemaking standards, to
spur greater reform activity by the states,'34 was also rejected by the
Senate. "[C]onsiderable progress toward ratemaking reform appears to be
taking place at the State and local level in the absence of extensive Federal
involvement," according to the Senate Committee report.'35 A 1979 survey
of rate design activities by state regulatory commissions strongly supports
this conclusion. 3 '
Over half the states responding to a survey conducted for the Electric
Power Research Institute3 7 had already considered or were considering the
standards proposed by President Carter. Of the 43 state regulatory commissions submitting responses, declining block rates had been considered by 34,138
133. Id. at 488.
134. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46, at 129-30. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying
text.

135. SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 13. "It was apparent to the committee that many
State utility commissions are currently involved in innovative rate-making and are working
toward the goal of conservation of energy through rate reform." Id. at 9.
136. See also Smith, The Developing Direction of Electric Rate Structures, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Aug. 26, 1976, at 28, which provides a review of state rate reform activity.
137. The report, entitled 1979 Survey of State Regulatory Commissions Rate Design Activities, was conducted by Elrick and Lavidge, Inc. for use in the Electric Utility Rate Design
Study. The survey constitutes Part 5 of ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DESIGN STUDY, REFERENCE
MANUAL AND PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING PURPA (Feb. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Survey of Activities].
138. Survey of Activities, supra note 137, at Table B.
DECLINING BLOCK RATES
Considered
Determined
Implemented
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
ALABAMA
X
X
X
ALASKA
X
X
ARIZONA
X
ARKANSAS
X
X
X
CALIFORNIA

X

*

*

COLORADO
CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE

X
X
X

X

X

DIST. OF COL.

*

*

*

FLORIDA
GEORGIA
HAWAII
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
IOWA

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
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time-of-day rates by 29,139 seasonal rates by 31,140 interruptible rates by 30,141

KANSAS
KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA
MAINE
MARYLAND
MASSACHUSETTS
MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA
MISSISSIPPI
MONTANA

Considered
No
Yes
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

NEW HAMPSHIRE

X

NEW JERSEY
NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK
NORTH CAROLINA
NORTH DAKOTA

X

OKLAHOMA
OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA
RHODE ISLAND
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSE
TEXAS
UTAH
WASHINGTON
WEST VIRGINIA
WISCONSIN
WYOMING
TOTAL STATES
RESPONDING
139. Id. at Table C.

X
X
X

ALABAMA
ALASKA
ARIZONA
ARKANSAS
CALIFORNIA

DECLINING BLOCK RATES
Implemented
Determined
No
Yes
No
Yes
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

*

*

*

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
34

8

Considered
No
Yes
X
X
X
X
X

25

7

24

0

TIME-OF-DAY RATES
Implemented
Determined
No
Yes
No
Yes

X

X
*

*
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TIME-OF-DAY RATES

COLORADO

Considered
No
Yes
X

Determined
Yes
No
X

X

CONNECTICUT

X

DELAWARE

X

X

DIST. OF COL.

X

X

FLORIDA

X

GEORGIA

X

HAWAII

X

ILLINOIS

X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X

INDIANA
IOWA

Implemented
Yes
No

X

X

KANSAS

X

KENTUCKY

X

LOUISIANA

X

MAINE

X

MARYLAND

X

MASSACHUSETTS

X

X

MICHIGAN

X

X

MINNESOTA

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

MISSISSIPPI

X

MONTANA

X

NEW HAMPSHIRE

X

X

X

NEW JERSEY

X

X

X

X

NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK

X

X

X

NORTH CAROLINA

X

X

X

NORTH DAKOTA

X

OKLAHOMA

X

X

OREGON

X

X

PENNSYLVANIA

X

X

RHODE ISLAND

X

SOUTH DAKOTA

X

TEXAS

X

UTAH

X

WASHINGTON

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

WEST VIRGINIA
X

X

WYOMING
TOTAL STATES
RESPONDING

X
X

X

TENNESSE

WISCONSIN

X

29

14

17

11

14

3
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Id.

ALABAMA
ALASKA

Considered
No
Yes
X
X

SEASONAL RATES
Determined
No
Yes
X

Implemented
No
Yes
X

*

*

X

ARIZONA
ARKANSAS

X

X

X

CALIFORNIA

X

*

*

COLORADO

X

X

CONNECTICUT

X

DELAWARE

X

X

X

DIST. OF COL.

*

*

*

FLORIDA

X

X

X

X
X

X

GEORGIA

X

HAWAII

X

ILLINOIS

X

X

X

INDIANA

X

X

X

IOWA

X

X

X

KANSAS

X

X

X

KENTUCKY

X

LOUISIANA

X

X

X

MAINE
MARYLAND

X

X

X

MASSACHUSETTS

X

X

X

MICHIGAN

X

X

X

MINNESOTA

X

X

X

MISSISSIPPI

X

MONTANA

X

NEW HAMPSHIRE

X

X

X

NEW JERSEY

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK

X

NORTH CAROLINA

X
X

NORTH DAKOTA
OKLAHOMA

X

X

X

OREGON

X

X

X

PENNSYLVANIA

X

X

X

RHODE ISLAND

X

X

X

SOUTH DAKOTA

X

X

X

X

X

X

TENNESSEE
TEXAS

X
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UTAH
WASHINGTON
WEST VIRGINIA
WISCONSIN
WYOMING
TOTAL STATES
RESPONDING
141.

Considered
No
Yes
X
X
X
X
X
31

11

SEASONAL RATES
Determined
No
Yes
X
X

Implemented
No
Yes
X
X
X

X
X
26
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3

26

0

Id. at Table D.

ALABAMA
ALASKA
ARIZONA
ARKANSAS
CALIFORNIA

Considered
No
Yes
X
X
X
X
X

COLORADO

X

CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE
DIST. OF COL.
FLORIDA
GEORGIA
HAWAII
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
IOWA
KANSAS
KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA
MAINE
MARYLAND
MASSACHUSETTS
MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA
MISSISSIPPI
MONTANA
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW JERSEY
NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK

X
X

INTERRUPTIBLE RATES
Implemented
Determined
No
Yes
No
Yes
X
X,

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
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and master metering by 21.2
Considered
No
Yes
NORTH CAROLINA

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA

X
X

RHODE ISLAND
SOUTH DAKOTA

X
X

TENNESSEE
TEXAS

X

UTAH

X

WASHINGTON

X

WISCONSIN

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

WYOMING
TOTAL STATES
RESPONDING

X

X

X

WEST VIRGINIA

142.

X
X

NORTH DAKOTA
OKLAHOMA

INTERRUPTIBLE RATES
Implemented
Determined
No
(es
No
Yes

30

13

26

4

26

0

Id. at Table E.

ALABAMA

PURPA: WHETHER OTHER STANDARDS ADOPTED
Mater Metering
No
Yes
X

ALASKA

X

ARIZONA

X

ARKANSAS

X

CALIFORNIA

*

X

COLORADO
CONNECTICUT

X
X

DELAWARE
DIST. OF COL.

*

FLORIDA

X
X

GEORGIA

X

HAWAII
ILLINOIS

X

INDIANA

X

IOWA

X

KANSAS

X
X

KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA

X
X

MAINE
MARYLAND

X

124
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The activity on the "Dingell-authored standards" was almost as impressive. Of the 41 states responding, at least 50% had adopted standards
on each of three issues: automatic adjustment claues, procedures for termination, and advertising."' On a fourth issue, information to consumers,
PURPA: WHETHER OTHER STANDARDS ADOPTED
Mater Metering
Yes
No
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

MASSACHUSETTS
MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA
MISSISSIPPI
MONTANA
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW JERSEY
NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK
NORTH CAROLINA
NORTH DAKOTA
OKLAHOMA
OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA
RHODE ISLAND
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
UTAH
WASHINGTON
WEST VIRGINIA
WISCONSIN
WYOMING
TOTAL STATES
RESPONDING
143. Id.

21

20

PURPA: WHETHER OTHER STANDARDS ADOPTED
Automatic
Information
Procedure
Adjustment
to
for
Clauses
Consumers
Termination
Advertising
Yes
ALABAMA
ALASKA
ARIZONA
ARKANSAS
CALIFORNIA

COLORADO

No

X

Yes

No

X
X
X

X

Yes
X

X
X
*

X

*

X

Yes

No

X
X
X
X

X

*

No

X
X
X
*

X

X
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PURPA: WHETHER OTHER STANDARDS ADOPTED
Automatic
Information
Procedure
Adjustment
to
for
Clauses
Consumers
Termination
Advertising
Yes

No

Yes

CONNECTICUT

X

DELAWARE

X

X

DIST. OF COL.

*

*

FLORIDA
GEORGIA

X

No

Yes

x

x

Yes
X

X

*

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

ILLINOIS

X

X

X

X

INDIANA

X

X

X

X

IOWA

X

X

X

X

KANSAS

X

X

X

X

KENTUCKY

X

X

X

LOUISIANA

X

X

MAINE

X

X

MARYLAND

X

MASSACHUSETTS

X

MICHIGAN

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

NEW HAMPSHIRE

X

X

X

NEW JERSEY

X

X

X

OKLAHOMA

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

SOUTH DAKOTA

X

*

TENNESSEE

X

X

X

TEXAS

X

X

X

UTAH

X

X

WASHINGTON

x

X

X

X

WEST VIRGINIA
WYOMING

X

X

X

X

21

X

*

X

X
20

15

X
X
X

X
X

25

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

WISCONSIN

X
X

PENNSYLVANIA

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

OREGON
RHODE ISLAND

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

MONTANA

NORTH DAKOTA

X

X
X

NORTH CAROLINA

X
X

X

MISSISSIPPI

NEW YORK

X
X

X

MINNESOTA

NEW MEXICO

No

X

*

X

HAWAII

No

21

X
X

19

31

10
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35% of the responding states had adopted standards.'44 As to other House
imposed standards, 29 of 42 states had already considered lifeline rates,'
See note 143 supra (Col. 2: Information to Consumers).
Id. at Table D.
PURPA LIFELINE RATES

144.
145.

Determined

Considered
Yes

Yes

Yes

No

*

*

*

X

ARIZONA
ARKANSAS

X

CALIFORNIA

X

COLORADO

X

X

X
X
X

CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE

X

X

DIST. OF COL.

X

X

FLORIDA

X

X
X
X

X

GEORGIA
HAWAII

X

ILLINOIS

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

INDIANA

X

IOWA
KANSAS

No

X

ALABAMA
ALASKA

No

Implemented

X
X

KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA

X

X

MAINE

X

X

MARYLAND

X

X

MASSACHUSETTS

X

X

X

MICHIGAN

X

X

X

MINNESOTA

X

X

X

X
X

X

MISSISSIPPI
MONTANA

X

X

X

NEW HAMPSHIRE

X

X

X

NEW JERSEY

X

X

X

X

NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK

X

NORTH CAROLINA

X

X

X
X
X

NORTH DAKOTA

X

OKLAHOMA
OREGON

X

X

PENNSYLVANIA

X

X

RHODE ISLAND

X

X
X
X
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while only 10 4of
43 were using marginal or incremental cost data to
6
establish rates.'

Considered
Yes
No
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
UTAH
WASHINGTON
WEST VIRGINIA
WISCONSIN
WYOMING
TOTAL STATES
RESPONDING

PURPA LIFELINE RATES
Determined
Implemented
Yes
No
Yes
No

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
29

X
X
13

146. Id. at Table A.
Marginal or incremental cost data used to
establish rates
Yes
No
ALABAMA
X
ALASKA
X
ARIZONA
X
ARKANSAS
X
CALIFORNIA
X
COLORADO
X
CONNECTICUT
X
DELAWARE
X
DIST. OF COL.
FLORIDA
X
GEORGIA
X
HAWAII
X
ILLINOIS
X
INDIANA
X
IOWA
X
KANSAS
X
KENTUCKY
X
LOUISIANA
X
MAINE
X
MARYLAND
X
MASSACHUSETTS
X
MICHIGAN
X

21

X
X
7

6

15
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Many of the states contemplating rate reform are awaiting the results
of projects conducted by several industry research groups, such as the
massive Electric Utility Rate Design Study undertaken by the Electric
Power Research Institute.'47 Other institutions conducting rate design and
load management technique studies are the Department of Energy, the
Natural Sciences Foundation, the Edison Electric Institute, and the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.'48
In the words of one witness before the Senate Committee, "[iln the face
of this intensity of interest, the swift process of change already underway,
Marginal or incremental cost data used to
establish rates
Yes

MINNESOTA
MISSISSIPPI
MONTANA
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW JERSEY
NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK
NORTH CAROLINA
NORTH DAKOTA
OKLAHOMA
OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA
RHODE ISLAND
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
UTAH
WASHINGTON
WEST VIRGINIA
WISCONSIN
WYOMING
TOTAL STATES
RESPONDING

No
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
10

33

147. PUB. UTIL. FORT., supra note 77, at 29.
148. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 264-65 (statement of Richard L. Dunham,
Chairman, FPC). Numerous articles analyzing the move away from traditional rate designs to
more innovative approaches have been written. See Crawford, An Electric Utility Perspective
on Rate Design Revisions, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 14, 1978, at 15; Kahn, Applications of
Economics to Utility Rate Structures, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 19, 1978, at 13; Lander, Public
Utility Rate Design: The Cost-of-Service Method of Pricing,19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 36 (1974); Mann,
Rate Structure Alternatives for Electricity, PUB. UTIL FORT., Jan 20, 1977, at 29; Ranninger,
Electric Rates- Where We Have Been, Where We Are Going, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 12, 1977,
at 29; Walters, The Great Rate Debate, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 16, 1976, at 17; Public Utility
Rate Reform: A Multi-Bias Approach, 13 GONZAGA L. REV. 365 (1978).
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and the strong initiative now being displayed by the State commissions, it
Government to assume the
is hard to see any advantage for the Federal
45
role of taskmaster and regulatory overlord.'
c.

Unwillingness to Usurp Traditional State Role

The third justification for curtailing federal intervention reflects the
Committee's opposition to destroying the traditional balance between state
and federal functions. The Senate Committee found the setting of minimum
into an area
standards for utility rates "would be an unnecessary intrusion
'
of the
Opponents
"'
States.
the
by
regulated
been
which has traditionally
administration's proposals seemed to be in general agreement that federal
intervention, at least in this particular area, would be counterproductive
5
and fail to improve significantly the process of regulation." ' Three reasons
were cited.
First, the states are better informed on regulatory issues arising out of
52
situations existing within their own borders,' and the regulatory process
could only be slowed by national legislation reflecting a lack of expertise at
the federal level.' 3 In other words, the federal government lacks a body of
knowledge that is comparable to the depth of knowledge accumulated in the
54
local regulation across the country.'
Secondly, utility ratemaking was perceived as an area where local par55
ticipation and responsiveness are acutely necessary.' Utility regulators are
required by statute to weigh several factors in rate determinationproviding reliable service, minimizing costs to consumers, and preserving
149. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 365 (statement of Joseph Swidler, former
Chairman, FPC). "The result can only be to relieve the State commissions of responsibility and
to substitute compulsion and friction for what is now an effective program moving on its own
merits." Id.
Mr. Swidler's statements, comprising 66 pages of material in the Senate Hearing record,
was probably the most persuasive evidence in opposition to the administration's bill. The committee members' discussions with and later reference back to Swidler indicate the respect he
commanded among the Senators. Several of the later witnesses particularly noted and deferred
to the thorough analysis of the legislation presented by Swidler.
Swidler's credibility can be attributed to several positions he has occupied in the utility
regulation field, giving him a unique perspective on the legislation. Not only had he served as
chairman of the Federal Power Commission, but he had served on the New York Public Service
Commission and was also a former member of the executive board of the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners, an organization of state commissioners. He testified before
the committee as a member of the law firm representing Commonwealth Edison of Chicago.
150. SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 9. "The committee further believes that extensive
Federal preemption of the traditional State and local processes for retail ratemaking might be
counterproductive in achieving the reforms now beginning to take place." Id. at 14.
151. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 268, 271 (statement of Richard L. Dunham,
Chairman, FPC); Id. at 772 (statement of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners).
152. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 271 (statement of Richard L. Dunham, Chairman, FPC).
153. "At present, the State regulatory agencies rather than the Federal Government,
possess the expertise to conduct the detailed costing and demand studies required to implement
rate structure revision." SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 9.

154. Id
155. See Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 486-87 (statement of Jay B. Kennedy,
Exec. Dir., Electricity Consumers Resource Council).
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the financial integrity of the utilities they regulate.' The reconciliation of
these goals is highly judgmental,'5 7 and accountability is retained when
regulatory commissioners are elected or appointed at the state level.' In
contrast, regulation from Washington, or pressure from Washington backed
up by preemptive authority, would be neither accessible nor accountable.'59
Lastly, federal legislation would fail to recognize regional disparities
and varying conditions under which utilities operate.' Besides type of
ownership, electric utilities are differentiated by fuel mixes for generation,
load factors, size, the economic and climatic nature of their service area, and
6
attitudes of the customers toward economic growth and development.' ' The
wide diversity of these variables makes it impossible to predict the effect of
62
specific ratemaking formulae as applied to a given company or area.' One
of the great strengths of state regulation is that it can give attention to the
specifics of individual company conditions and consumer needs and practices
in adapting rate policies to particular cases. This advantage would be
severely weakened by federal legislation.'63
d. Assuring the Viability of the Utility Industry
As a fourth ground for rejecting the administration's proposals, the
Senate Committee found that the "potential uncertainty and delays accompanying federal regulation"'6 4 threatened to adversely affect the financial
health of the utility industry.' The Committee heard testimony from two
financial analysts who predicted that the legislation will be perceived by in156. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 340 (statement of Robert Uhler, Exec. Dir.,
Electric Utility Rate Design Study). Recently, however, the scope of the ratemaking process has
been expanded to consider not only the reasonableness of utility rates, but other social and
economic objectives as well. See Aman and Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate
Reform: Taxation Through Ratemaking? 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1085 (1977); Amyot, Electric and Gas
Rates-the Current Consumer Battleground, 17 N. HAMP. B.J. 247 (1976); Galligar, Rate Design
Objectives and Realities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 6, 1976, at 30.
157. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 340 (statement of Robert Uhle, Exec. Dir.,
Electric Utility Rate Design Study). See also Mann, User Power and ElectricityRates, 17 J. L.
& ECON. 433 (1974).
158. See Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 370-71 (statement of Joseph Swidler,
former Chairman, FPC).
159. See Senate Hearings:pt. 1, supra note 15, at 485 (statement of Jay B. Kennedy, Exec.
Dir., Electricity Consumers Resource Council).
160. "Moreover, the committee recognized that rate structures must reflect the individual
needs and local peculiarities of each utilities' service area; an appropriate rate design for Hawaii
will not be appropriate for Idaho .. " SENATE REPORT, supra Note 107, at 9.
"Studies and experience thus far with the methods set forth in the President's bill do not
appear to support any contention that they will be universally applicable to ratemaking in
diverse utility systems throughout the nation." Id. at 13.
161. House Hearings: pt. 3, vol II, supra note 41, at 868 (statement of Sherwood Smith on
behalf of the Edison Electric Institute).
162. See Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 363-64 (statement of Joseph Swidler,
former Chairman, FPC).
163. Id. at 364.
164. SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 9.
165. "Finally the committee felt that the potential uncertainty and delays accompanying
Federal regulation threatened to have an adverse impact on the financial health of the utility industry which outweighed the projected savings in capital expenditures claimed by supporters of
the administration's proposals." Id.
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vestors as creating more risks because it adds more regulation.' 6 The increased risk will result in a higher cost of capital to utilities for continued
investment, a higher cost ultimately borne by the ratepayer.'67 A utility
unable to provide a higher rate of return would face the peril of attracting insufficient capital to meet its increasing generating needs. Electricity shortages could result.' 9 In the words of a brokerage house executive, by attempting to do "too much too fast ... [Congress is] ... risking chaos in the financial
markets."'' ,
e.

ProperRate Methodologies

Finally, the Senate Committee expressed concern over the lack of a
consensus as to the proper methodology to be used to set rates for the
various utilities.'70 According to a witness testifying before the Senate
tribunal, some of the methods prescribed in the legislation are relatively
untested and the effects of their implementation would be subject to
speculation.' 7 ' A wait-and-see approach was advocated, with no national application mandated until the beneficial or adverse effects of proposed rate
reform could be determined by adequate testing.' 2
One such untested method, marginal cost pricing, received particular
attention by witnesses appearing before the Senate Committee.' Definitional and implementation problems of marginal cost pricing were widely
discussed. Defining marginal costs is complicated by the considerable
166. Senate Hearings: pt. 2, supra note 29, at 4 (statement of Eugene W. Meyer, Vice
President, Kidder, Peabody & Co.); Id. at 9 (statement of Frederick B. Whittemore, Managing
Director, Morgan Stanley & Co.).
167. See Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 370 (statement of Joseph Swidler,
former Chairman, FPC).
168. See Id.
169. Senate Hearings: pt. 2, supra note 29, at 11 (statement of Frederick B. Whittemore,
Managing Director, Morgan Stanley and Co.).
170. ".... nor is there any national consensus as to the proper costing methodology to be
used to set rates for the various utilities." SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 9.
"Studies and experience thus far with the methods set forth in the President's bill do not
appear to support any contention that they will be universally applicable to ratemaking in
diverse utility systems throughout the nation." Id. at 13.
171. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 264 (statement of Richard L. Dunham, Chairman, FPC).
172. Senate Hearings: pt. 2, supra note 29, at 31 (statement of Senator Richard Lugar of
Indiana).
173. Marginal cost pricing of electricity is probably the "hottest" issue facing electric utility
regulators today, and the subject has received a commensurate amount of attention in legal
publications. See Cudahy, Rate Design Today: The Aftermath of Madison Gas, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
May 20, 1976, at 15; Huntington, The Rapid Emergency of Marginal Cost Pricingin the Regulation of Electric Utility Rate Structures, 55 BOSTON U. L. REV. 689 (1975); Morrissey, The Changing Structures of Utility Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 17, 1976, at 15; Morton, Long-Run Incremental Costs and the Pricing of Electricity, PUB. UTIL. FORT., pt. 1, Mar. 11, 1976, at 34, pt. 2,
Mar. 25, 1976, at 25; Pierce, Marginal Cost Pricingfor Energy-But How? PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec.
7, 1978, at 24; Renshaw, The Pricing of Electricity, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 1, 1976, at 28; Reform
of Electricity Pricing in the United States, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 183 (1975); Lexonomics and the
Electrical Utility Industry: In Search of the Optimal Rate Structure, 61 IowA L. REV. 134 (1975).
For a quantitative approach, see C. Cicchetti, W. Gillen, & P. Smolensky, THE MARGINAL
COST AND PRICING OF ELECTRICITY 3 (1977).
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disagreement among economists as to the proper methods for measuring
marginal costs.'74 At least five different techniques for calculating marginal
costs have been suggested,'75 none of which can be accurately verified
because they are, by definition, the result of long-range projections and
estimates." 6
The problems in implementation are varied. Undoubtedly, the greatest
problem is the allocation of excess revenues produced by marginal cost pricing."' In the present increasing-cost economy, "marginal cost calculations
result in excessive revenues which must be reduced to the level allowed by
the regulatory authority."'7 8 "Such reduction must be based on subjective
judgment and may be quite arbitrary because no rational method has been
developed for making the reduction."'7 9 Methods for making the reduction
are particularly important since, if done improperly, any benefits which may
result from marginal cost calculations will be significantly nullified.'8'
The impropriety of requiring all utilities to consider marginal costs in
ratemaking was illustrated by testimony of an official from Southwestern
Public Service, a utility experiencing marginal costs which are lower than
average costs in its system."' If marginal cost pricing were applied to this
utility, it would be unable to generate sufficient revenue to continue
operating."2
As witnessed by a review of the Committee report and the testimony
before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Senate members could find no overwhelming justification for the substantial federal role
in utility ratemaking proposed by President Carter. In fact, the Senators
were overwhelmed by testimony from utilities and utility regulators in a
massive lobbying effort dedicated to preventing the enactment of such national legislation. In light of such opposition, when coupled with a
predisposition against preempting a traditional state function, the Committee action in scrapping the President's bill was hardly a surprise. The
following section will examine the Committee's attempt at establishing the
proper federal role in utility rate regulation.
174. Senate Hearings: pt. 2, supra note 29, at 140 (statement of Sherwood Smith, President, Carolina Power and Light Co.).
175. Id. According to Joseph Swidler, now associated with a Washington, D.C. law firm,
four different methods of determining marginal cost were proposed in a recent Commonwealth
Edison of Chicago rate case. The increase in rates using the proposals ranged from $111-493
million. Another Energy Bill Sleeper, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1977, at 10, col. 1.
176. Senate Hearings: pt. 2, supra 29, at 140 (statement of Sherwood Smith, President,
Carolina Power and Light).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 142.
179. Id. According to one author, marginal cost pricing of utility services may come under
an "undue discrimination" attack since the price per unit of consumption differs from one consumer to another. See Kadane, The Legality of Marginal Cost Pricingfor Utility Services, 5
HOFSTRA L. REV. 755 (1977).
180. Senate Hearings: pt. 2, supra note 29, at 140 (statement of Sherwood Smith, President, Carolina Power and Light). Industry lobbyists feared the rebates of the higher revenues
would go disproportionately to residential users. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
181. Senate Hearings: pt. 2, supra note 29, at 64 (statement of Roger Owen, Vice President, Southwestern Public Service Co.).
182. Id- at 65.
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.2.

Provisions of the Senate Bill

The substituted bill authored by the Senate Committee, S.2114, scarcely resembled the administration proposals. The broad federal authority to
impose standards, set rates in the absence of state action, and appeal state
83
rate cases to federal courts was removed' and in its place the Secretary of
Energy was given limited authority to intervene as a party in state rate
cases' 84 and the power to require cost of service reports by utilities and
state regulatory agencies.'85 But remnants of the Carter bill, as amended by
the House, remained. A majority of the rate-making standards promulgated
by the administration and subsequent House action were included as considerations the Secretary of Energy was to advocate in his role as intervenor. 8 ' Specifically, the Secretary of Energy was authorized to intervene in state rate proceedings solely for the purpose of advocating
policies" 7 which furthered the national objectives as set forth in the introduction of the bill: (1) to encourage overall energy conservation, (2) to encourage efficient use of utility facilities and resources, and (3) to encourage
equitable ratemaking.'8 8 As part of such intervention the Secretary was to
examine the utility's methods of determining costs of service and the extent
to which the national purposes might be advanced by the application of
90
rates based on cost of service, ' including marginal or incremental costs;'
by the elimination of declining block rates;"' by the implementation of time94
of-day rates,'92 seasonal rates,8 3 load management techniques,' or special
5
rates for interruptible service."
9
To be an "effective advocate" of the national purposes, ' and to be able
97
to monitor the activities of the state regulatory authorities,' the Secretary
98
was to be furnished bi-annual reports from state commissions and utilities.'
These reports were to contain any information which the Secretary deemed
183. "The committee therefore, chose to restrict the Federal role created by this regulation to one of data collection, further study and evaluation of ratemaking methods and informed
advocacy of rate reform within the existing and traditional state and local ratemaking procedures .... [The Secretary of Energy] is granted no new authority to impose any mandatory
Federal policies upon either the State regulatory agencies or the nonregulated utilities." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 109, at 13-14.
The power to appeal to federal courts was expressly denied. Section 6(c) of S.2114 provided
.nothing in this Act shall authorize [the Secretary of Energy] to appeal or otherwise seek
judicial review of the decisions of such regulatory authority or to become a party to any action
to obtain such review or appeal."
184. S.2114, supra note 111, § 6(a).
185. Id. § 5(b).
186. Id. § 7. See notes 189-195 infra and accompanying text.
187. S.2114, supra note 111, § 6(b).

188. Id- § 2.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id-§
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id- §
I& §
Id. §

7(a)(1).
7(a)(2).
7(b)(2).
7(b)(3).
7(b)(5).
7(b)(4).
7(b)(6).

SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 10.
Id
S.2114, supra note 111, § 5(b).
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necessary to ascertain costs related to providing electricity."' The
Secretary was also required to report to Congress on the implementation of
his responsibilities, the status of ratemaking activity by the states, and
recommendations for futher federal action."'
Due to a lack of expertise at the federal level,"' and a fear that federal
preemption of state ratemaking might be counterproductive,"' the Senate
Committee saw no justification for further extension of federal involvement
in utility regulation."' Thus, the federal role was restricted to "one of data
collection, further study and evaluation of ratemaking methods, and informed advocacy of rate reform within the existing and traditional State and
local ratemaking procedures.""' As Senator Jackson framed it, the bill was
"a 'responsible beginning of what will be a long-term responsibility for the
federal government' in encouraging the adoption of equitable rates that
make the most efficient use of capital and energy.""'
The bill was reported out of committee on September 19, 1977, by a
vote of 12-3, and proceeded to the Senate floor."'
3.

The "Lifeline" Amendment

Senator Gary Hart of Colorado did not agree with the denuding of the
national legislation by the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
particularly where the elderly were concerned. Hart proposed an amendment to S. 2114 that would require low electric rates for a subsistence
amount of electricity to everyone in the country over 62-years old and
anyone else receiving social security or railroad retirement benefits."' The
amendment was described by its sponsor as "an immediate, easily administered response to a well-documented problem faced by seniors. '
The notion of providing an amount of electricity for essential needs at a
low cost, known as lifeline rates, is one of the most controversial issues facing state legislatures and state regulatory agencies today."' Proponents
claim equitable redistribution of wealth can be attained through electricity
rates because the cost of lifeline subsidies would be borne either by residential customers using more than the lifeline amount or by industrial and com199. SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 10.
200. S. 2114, supra note 111, § 8.
201. SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 9.
202. Id. at 14.
203. "The committee believes that the approach taken in the substitute bill coupled with
the authorities of existing law represent the maximum responsible extension of federal involvement in utility ratemaking which is supported by current knowledge." Id. at 14.
204. Id. at 13-14.
205.

PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 27, 1977, at 30.

206. SENATE REPORT, supra note 109, at 11.
207. Amendment 1399, S. 2144, § 15(b)(2) 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
208. PUB. UTIL. FORT.. supra note 205, at 30.
209. See also Frank, Lifeline Proposals and Economic Efficiency Requirements, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., May 26, 1977, at 11; Howe, Lifeline Rates-Benefits for Whom? PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 29,
1976, at 22. Commentators have focused particularly on California's experience with lifeline rates.
See Dahl, California'sLifeline Policy, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 31, 1978, at 13; Reed, Utility Rates
Under the NationalEnergy Act Quo Vodis?PuB.UTIL. FORT., July 20, 1978, at 11; Symons, California Rate Experiments:Lifeline or Leadweight, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 26, 1978, at 11.
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mercial users.10 Opponents to such measures have set forth numerous
arguments, many of which were debated on the Senate floor as the Hart
amendment was discussed."' Two arguments in particular deserve mention.
First, it is questionable whether state regulatory commissions are in a
position to administer a welfare type of income redistribution scheme efficiently." ' As Senator Clifford P. Hansen of Wyoming stated in discussions
before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, "wouldn't
it be better to leave with the established agencies of Government that deal
with the problems of older people and specifically with welfare to recomthan to mix up the admend adjustments that ought to be made ... rather
2 '3
purpose?"
same
the
accomplish
to
rates
of
justing
Secondly, opponents assert that lifeline rates do a poor job of matching
14
the benefits with the persons needing them. In other words, lifeline rates
fail to benefit many that need assistance while at the same time benefitting
many who do not." ' People who would benefit from subsistence rates or a
subsidized basis are by no means the same as those who need help in paying
are not necessarily those who use
their bills.21 6 Poor people or the elderly
27
the smallest amount of electricity.
In response to a suggestion by Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas that
many undeserving well-off people would be receiving lifeline rates paid for
in part by the poor under Senator Hart's proposal, Hart countered that only
100/0 of those over 62 had incomes in excess of $10,000.28 The response apparently satisfied many senators, and the amendment passed, 57-36.1" A major extension of federal legislation into state utility ratemaking so persuasively and thoroughly laid aside by the Senate Committee was partially
resurrected on the floor of the Senate.
The entire measure, as amended, passed by an 86-7 vote on October 6,
1977,220 and the bill was sent to a House-Senate conference committee where
the diverse proposals approved by the two bodies would be reconciled.
D.

RECONCILIATION BY THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

The conference committee was composed of twenty-five representatives, headed by Congressmen Harley Staggers of West Virginia and
210. Senate Hearings:pt. 2, supranote 29, at 152 (statement of Sherwood Smith, President,
Carolina Power and Light Co.).
211. 123 CONG. REC. S16,406-14 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1977).
212. Senate Hearings:pt. 1, supranote 15, at 334 (statement of Robert Uhler, Exec. Dir., Electric Utility Rate Design Study).
213. Senate Hearings: pt. 1, supra note 15, at 131 (statement of Senator Clifford P. Hansen of
Wyoming).
214. Senate Hearings:pt. 1, supra note 15, at 386-87 (statement of Joseph Swidler, former
Chairman, FPC).
215. Senate Hearings:pt. 2,supra note 29, at 151 (statement of Sherwood Smith, President,
Carolina Power and Light Co.).
216. Senate Hearings:pt. 1,supra note 15, at 386-87 (statement of Joseph Swidler, former
Chairman, FPC).
217. Senate Hearings: pt. 2, supra note 29, at 151 (statement of Sherwood Smith, President,
Carolina Power and Light Co.).
218. 123 CONG. REC. S16,412-13 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1977).
219. Id. at S16,414
220. 123 CONG. REC. S16,518 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977).
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Thomas Ashley of Ohio, and eleven senators, led by Senator Henry Jackson
of Washington."'
The opening day action of the committee illustrated how far apart the
two bodies were on the utility proposals. On a motion by Senator Bennett
Johnston of Louisiana, the Senate members voted 9-0 to reject the first
forty-three pages of the House bill. 2 The House group responded by spurning, with a couple of Republican dissents, the corresponding Senate provisions.223
After four days of intense debate,224 an agreement was hammered out,
with the House giving the most ground on the major provisions.225 By
generally embodying the language of the Senate bill,226 the conference bill
accepted the principles of reform, but not of rigid federal pricing
standards.227 Though the bill stops short of ordering major rate changes by
utilities, it will force state utility regulatory agencies to consider seriously
new rate structures designed to promote energy conservation.228
The conference bill grants the Secretary of Energy the right to enter
state rate cases and present evidence on rate design that would encourage
conservation and more efficient use of resources.2" State commissions will
be required within three years to hold hearings and issue findings on the
"appropriateness" of implementing six "ratemaking standards": time-of-day
rates, seasonal rates, cost-of-service pricing, interruptible rates, load
management techniques, and a prohibition on declining block rates unless
cost-justified."0
Under the compromise, the state commissions are also required to hold
hearings within two years and, to the extent they determine "appropriate,"
adopt prohibitions on master metering, procedures for reviewing automatic
adjustment clauses, procedures to provide adequate information to consumers, prohibitions on charging ratepayers for certain advertising, and
procedures to protect ratepayers against abrupt termination of service. 3
Some concessions were also granted by the Senate conferees.232 The
Secretary of Energy was given the authority to appeal ratemaking decisions
on the standards to state courts if the Department of Energy had participated in the original proceeding2 3 Consumer intervenors who conof rate cases and could have their extributed substantially to the outcome
2 34
penses reimbursed by utilities.
221. 123 CONG. REG. S17,164 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1977).
222. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1977, at 57, col. 6.
223. Id.
224. PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 8, 1977, at 34.
225. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1977, at DI, col. 6.
226. PUB. UTIL. FORT.. supra note 224, at 34.
227. Energy: The Current Way, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977, at IV 3, col. 6.
228. Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1977, at 6, col. 1.
229. H.R. Rep. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. Rep. No. 1292, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT], § 121(a).
230. Id § 111(d).
231. Id. § 113(b).
232. PUB. UTIL. FORT.. supra note 224, at 34.
233. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 229, § 123(c).
234. Id. § 122(a).

Legislative Evolution

19791

An expected battle over the status of lifeline rates for the elderly
never materialized as the Senate conferees provided little support for the
23
amendment approved solidly in their chamber. The Senate group agreed
to drop the mandatory lifeline rate provision and instead adopted the House
236
language which only requires state commissions to consider lifeline rates.
The conference bill was reintroduced as H.R. 4018, and passed the
Senate, 76-13, on October 10, 1978.237 One week later, the House approved,
231-168.238 On November 9, 1978, President Carter signed into law the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 as one of the five parts of the National Energy Act. 239 The following section will describe in detail Title I of
this Act.
E.

TITLE I OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY POLICIES ACT OF 1978
1.

Scope and Purpose

By definition, Title I of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act applies only to utilities having retail sales of electric energy greater than 500
24 °
million kilowatt hours in a given year. Therefore, some 30024utilities'
At the
investor, publicly, and cooperatively owned-will be affected.
the apof
a
list
publish
will
of
Energy
beginning of each year, the Secretary
plicable utilities.242
Title I is intended to encourage rate reform for retail electric utilities
which will achieve one or more of three purposes: (1) conservation of energy
by the end-users of electricity, (2) efficient use of utility facilities and
resources, including capital resources, and (3) achievement of equitable rates
for electric consumers.243 These three purposes are intended to supplement
state law and not displace it; consequently, some states may consider other
purposes as well.244
Title I establishes eleven federal standards for the design of electric
utility rates and the operation of electric utilities, most of which are intended to contribute to achieving one or more of the above purposes. These
eleven standards fall into two classes-§111(d) standards and §113(b) standards.
a. §111(d) Standards
Section 111(d) establishes six federal ratemaking standards which state
commissions are required to consider with respect to each utility subject to
Title .25 According to §112, the state regulatory authority is required to: (1)
235.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 22, 1977, at 25-26.
Id See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 229,

§ 114(b).

124 CONG. REC. S17,649 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978).
124 CONG. REC. H13,427 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6.
Id § 102.

241. ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DESIGN STUDY, REFERENCE MANUAL AND PROCEEDINGS FOR IMPLEMENTING PURPA pt. 3, 13 (Feb. 1979) [hereinafter cited as REFERENCE MANUAL].

242.
243.

Pub. L. No. 95-617, supranote 6, § 102(c).
Id. § 101. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 229, at 69.

244.

REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 232, pt. 3, at 11.

245.

Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 111(d).
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commence consideration of the §111(d) standards within two years, and (2)
make a determination within three years as to whether it is appropriate to
implement the standard with respect to the particular utility." 6
These six §111(d) standards are as follows:
COST OF SERVICE-Rates are required to reflect the costs of providing electric service to each class of consumers. 47
DECLINING BLOCK RATES-Rates are prohibited from declining as
consumption increases except to the extent a utility can demonstrate that
the energy costs of providing electric service to such a class decreases. 48
246. Id § 112(b). The "appropriatness" determination of § 111(a) is to be made in light of the
three purposes of Title I as set forth in § 101. Id. § 111(a). However, the state regulatory agency is
not required to implement if in contradiction with state law. Section 111(a) also provides that
"nothing in this subsection prohibits any state regulatory authority.., from making any determination that it is not appropriate to implement any such standard, pursuant to its authority under
otherwise applicable State law." The result is four combinations of circumstances possible under
the § 111(a) definition of "appropriateness." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 72-73. These
combinations are set forth in the table below.
Deermnation of Appropri
nes of lll(dStanard under
Law
PURPA

"The particular standard isappropriate "The standard isinappropriate to carry
to carry out the purposes of section 101
when applied to a particular utility"

Combination 1
"Implementation is consis- 1. The "state regulatory autent with otherwise appli- thority would be authorized by
Federal law to implement the
cable state law"
standard" (in case state law is
inadequate or silent).
2. "Failure to implement such
standard would not constitute a
violation of [section 111] since
this section does not require
implementation of any standard."
3. "But failure [to implement]
could violate otherwise applicable state law, where such
law for example, requires the
regulatory body to act in accordance with determinations
made on the record.

Combination II
"In this case, nothing in the
legislation would require
or bar
implementation
implementation."

Combination III
"Implementation is inconsis- "In this case, otherwise applitent with otherwise appli- cable State law governs and
prevents the implementation of
cable state law"
the standard."

Combination IV
"In this case, nothing in the
legislation would support any
state regulatory authority (or
non-regulatory utility) or any
court in implementing the standard."

Partridge, A Road Map to Title I of the Public Utility Regulatory PoliciesAct of 1978, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Jan. 18, 1979, at 20.
247. Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 111(d)(1). This standard is subject to the provisions
of § 115(a), which requires identification of cost differences attributable to differences between
customers, daily and seasonal time of use, demand, and energy components of cost.
248. Id. § 111(d)(2).
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TIME-OF-DAY RATES-Rates must reflect the cost of providing elecat different times of the day
tric service to each class of electric consumers
2 49
cost-effective.
not
are
unless such rates
SEASONAL RATES-Rates must reflect the costs of providing elec0
tric service to each class of consumers at different seasons of the year.5
INTERRUPTIBLE RATES-Industrial and commercial electric consumers must be offered an interruptible rate which reflects the cost of pro51
viding such interruptible service.
LOAD MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES-Utilities must offer its con25 2
which (1) are reliable, (2) prosumers such load management techinques
vide useful energy capacity3 management advantages to the electric utility,
and (3) are cost-effective.1
Sections 111(b) and (c) specify the procedural requirements which the
state commissions must follow in considering the §111(d)4 standards. Consideration must be made after public notice and hearing." The determination must be (1) in writing, (2) based upon findings and 55upon evidence
If the state
presented at the hearing, and (3) available to the public.
regulatory agency declines to implement a standard, it must state in
writing the reasons therefor, and such statement must be available to the
public.'
b.

§113(b) Standards

Section 113(b) establishes five additional federal standards which relate
only indirectly to rate structure. The §113(b) standards are more "policyoriented" in that they relate to terms and conditions of electric service.
According to §113(a), state regulatory agencies must provide 2 notice and conduct a hearing regarding these standards within two years.
The §113(b) standards are as follows:
259
master meterMASTER METERING-To the extent cost-effective,
6
buildings.
new
in
restricted
ing is prohibited or
249. Id. § 111(d)(3). This standard is modified by § 115(b), which defines "cost-effective" as
the situation when long-run benefits of time-of-day rates to the electric utility and each class of
its consumers are expected to exceed the metering costs and other costs associated with such

rates.

250.
251.
252.

Id. § 111(d)(4).
Id § 111(d)(5).
"Load management technique" is defined under § 3(8) to be "any technique (other

than a time-of-day or seasonal rate) to reduce the maximum kilowatt demand on the electric

utility."
253. Id. § 111(d)(6). "Cost-effective" is defined under § 115(c) to include any technique which
reduces maximum kilowatt demand and whose long-run cost savings exceed the long-run costs to
the utility associated with the technique.
254. Id § 111(b)(1).
255. Id. § 111(b)(1)(A), (B), (C).
256. Id. § 111(c)(2).
257. Partridge, supra note 246, at 21.
258. Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 113(a).
259. "Cost-effective", as defined under § 115(d)(3), requires that long-run benefits to a
building's electric customers outweigh the costs of installing the meters.
260. Id- § 113(b)(1).
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AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE-Rate increases pursuant to
an automatic adjustment clause are prohibited261 unless the clause (1) is
reviewed every four years in an evidentiary hearing262 to ensure that the
clause provides incentives for the efficient use of resources, and (2) is
reviewed biannually to ensure maximum economies in those operations and
procedures affecting the rates to which the clause applies.263
INFORMATION TO CONSUMERS-Customers must be sent a clear
and concise explanation of existing rate schedules and any proposed rate
schedule.264
ADVERTISING-Electric utilities are prohibited from charging promotional and political advertising off to ratepayers.265
TERMINATION OF ELECTRIC SERVICE-Electric service cannot be
terminated266 unless (1) the customer is given reasonable prior notice and
has opportunity to dispute, and (2) conditions are not such that termination
would be especially dangerous to a consumer's health.6 7
The procedural requirements in considering §113(b) standards are less
onerous that those applicable to the §111(d) standards.266 Public notice and a
hearing are required when state commissions consider the §113(b) standards, 9 but written reasons are necessary only if the standard is not
adopted by the commission within two years.7
2. Lifeline Rates
Section 114 grants an exception to the cost-of-service standard of
§ 111(d)(1) where a state regulatory agency approves or allows a rate "for
essential needs" of residential electric customers which is lower than a costof-service rate. 1 While lifeline rates were not formally established as a
federal standard, §114(b) in effect makes lifeline rates the twelfth federal
standard by requiring a formal consideration of such rates within two years
by all utilities subject to Title I.272 In contrast to the other eleven standards,
261. Id. § 113(b)(2).
262. "Evidentiary hearing" is a proceeding which is open to the public, includes notice to
participants and an opportunity to present direct and rebuttal evidence and to cross-examine
witnesses, includes a written decision based on the record, and is subject to judicial review. Id §
3(6)(A).
263. Id. § 115(e).
264. Id. § 113(b)(3), § 115(f).
265. Id. § 113(b)(5). Similar to the original House provision (see notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text), utilities are not prohibited from using these types of advertising; only from
making the ratepayers finance it. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 229, at 77.
Section 115(h)(1)(B) defines political advertising to mean advertising "for the purpose of influencing public opinion with respect to legislative, administrative, or electoral matters, or with
respect to any controversial issue of public importance."
Promotional advertising is defined in § 115(h)(1)(C) to include advertising "for the purpose of encouraging any person to select or use the service or additional service of an electric utility ..
266. Id. § 113(b)(4).
267. Id. § 115(g).
268. Partridge, supra note 246, at 21.
269. Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 113(a).
270. Id. § 113(c).
271. Id. § 114(a).
272. Id. § 114(b). See Toll, Some Legal and Policy Questions Presented by the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act PUB. UTIL. FORT.. March 1, 1979, at 47.
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however, previous proceedings or determinations as to lifeline rates will not
be treated as complying with Title ."
3.

Intervention and Consumer Representation

Section 121 provides that to initiate and participate in the consideration of one or more standards, the Secretary of Energy, any affected electric utility, " or any electric consumer of an affected electric utility may intervene and participate as a matter of right in any ratemaking proceeding
or other appropriate regulatory proceeding relating to rates or rate
design.,' Also, any intervenor or participant must have access to information available to other parties to the proceeding if such information is relevant."'8
Section 122, which relates to consumer representation, is intended to
provide a mechanism to assure that the interests of electric consumers will
be represented at the state level in proceedings dealing with the federal
standards. 7 Two options are available to meet this objective. Under §122(a)
the affected utility may be assessed reasonable attorneys' fees, expert
witness fees, and other "reasonable costs" if an electric consumer "substantially contributed" to the proceeding."' Alternatively, §122(b) provides that
the state or state reglatory agency may have a program to otherwise provide adequate compensation to intervenors."' The conferees expressly
stated that such a program may include an adequately funded office of
public counsel which sufficiently represents the interests of consumers.28
4.

Judicial Review and Enforcement

Section 123 provides that the review and enforcement of state
regulatory proceedings is primarily in the state courts.28' Federal courts can
act only to enforce the right of certain parties to intervene in rate cases,
and then only when that right has been denied by state courts. 2 Section
123(c) also provides that only parties that participated in the original rate
proceedings may seek judicial review of state regulatory actions." 3
5. PriorProceedings
Section 124 deals with the question of whether and to what extent
prior or pending proceedings will be treated as fulfilling the obligations of
Title .84 This section represents a recognition on the part of the conferees
273. Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 114(c).
274. "Affected electric utility" was defined by the conferees to include "any utility which
is subject to regulation by the same regulatory authority which utility might be affected by
precedents set in a case relating to another utility." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 220, at 82.
275. Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 121(a).
276. Id. § 121(b).
277. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 229, at 82.
278. Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 122(a).
279. Id- § 122(b).
280. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 229, at 83.
281. Id.
282. Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 123(b).
283. Id. § 123(c).
284. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 229, at 85.
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that several state regulatory authorities may have already addressed one or
more of the standards before enactment of the legislation.285 According to
§124, prior and pending proceedings will be treated as complying with the
requirements of Title I if such proceedings "substantially conform" to the
procedural requirements of the Act.28
The conferees elaborated on the meaning of "substantial conformance":
The fact that the prior proceeding did not permit the full right of
participation and intervention as required by section 121 of this
title does not automatically constitute the absence of substantial
conformance. It is not the intention of the conferees that the standards be reconsidered at great expense and without purpose if
the original proceedings substantially conformed with the requirements of this title. The essential feature of the process contemplated by the conferees in this title with respect to the standards established by section 111(d) is that there be utility-byutility analysis of the appropriateness of these standards to carry
out the purposes specified in section 101.2"7
The only standard to which this "grandfathering" provision does not
apply is the lifeline section, §114, which requires new proceedings for consideration of lifeline rates for every utility.288
Data Collection
Section 133 requires electric utilities to gather information which the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission deems necessary to determine the
costs associated with providing electric service. 8 The electric utilities are
required to file this information with the Commission"8 and state regulatory
authorities,"' and to make it available to the public.2" 2
The Commission is mandated to require the inclusion of four items of
information in particular: (1) the costs of serving each electric consumer
class,28 3 (2) daily kilowatt demand load curves for all electric consumer
classes,2 4 (3) annual capital, operating and maintenance costs,"5 and (4) costs
of purchased power.8 8
CONCLUSION

Title I of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 represents
an acceptable compromise of diverse proposals on federal activity in public
utility regulation. An ingredient essential to the Congressional and ex285.
286.

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id.
Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 124.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 229, at 85.
Pub. L. No. 95-617, supra note 6, § 114(c).
Id. § 133(a).
Id § 133(c)(1).
Id. § 133(c)(2).
Id. § 133(c).
Id. § 133(a)(1).
Id. § 133(a)(2).
Id. § 133(a)(3).
Id. § 133(a)(4).
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ecutive approval of this legislation was a final compromise which left each
party with the notion that it significantly contributed to the legislation. The
final act provides such an accord.
President Carter succeeded in establishing federal ratemaking standards, and the specific reforms he advocated essentially developed into the
§111(d) standards. The administration's goal of uniform nationwide progress
in rate reform is furthered by the inclusion of specific timetables for state
consideration of the guidelines.
The House of Representatives, particularly Congressman John Dingell,
made its mark on the statute by addressing several additional reforms,
resulting in the §113(b) standards. In addition, the liberalized federal intervention provisions and sections relating to greater consumer participation in rate proceedings can be traced to House action on the legislation.
The Senate forced a reconsideration of extensive federal involvement in
utility regulation, and the result is a measure which stops short of mandating rate changes by utilities. By giving state regulatory agencies the option of accepting or rejecting the federal standards, the legislation grants
the states the flexibility deemed so important by the Senate. The upper
chamber also drafted the data collection provisions which will ensure
greater expertise and more informed intervention by federal officials in the
future.
The Act which emerged thus leaves the primary responsibility for
retail rate regulation to state agencies, but forces the states to consider
alternative rate structures and utility practices which are designed to
foster energy conservation. While Title I substantially expands federal involvement in utility regulation, it is a non-disruptive intrusion that will
stimulate a surge in rate reform activities by states in areas which provide
the greatest potential for energy conservation and more efficient use of
capital resources.
James Maurice Van Nostrand

